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and management problems will be solved
any time soon. One can only hope, nevertheless, that this book’s comprehensive
recommendations will encourage and
guide courageous leaders to make a start.
WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE

Naval War College

Steinbruner, John D. Principles of Global Security.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
270pp. $44.95

Unconvincing—that one word accurately
describes this effort of the prolific author
and former Brookings fellow John
Steinbruner to explain why and how the
“potentially catastrophic consequences of
traditional security practices” mandate
radical changes in U.S. defense policies.
Steinbruner argues that discontinuities in
the international system make obsolete
the realist view that nation-states need to
rely on military power for their security.
From this premise, he implies that the
United States should not seek to maintain military superiority over potential
opponents. In this new formula, deterrence, which he describes as a Cold War
doctrine, should be “subordinated to the
countervailing idea of reassurance.”
Globalization, Steinbruner holds, has
made it “too expensive to rule by force,”
and competition among nations or societies is being replaced by cooperation;
therefore, the whole notion of needing a
strong military defense is dangerous. Unfortunately for his premise, Steinbruner
then turns around and uses a pseudorealist argument to explain why other nations would “naturally” seek to oppose
and confront American military superiority in a world in which they are
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benefiting from United States–led
globalization.
At its core, the book’s fundamental problem is that it approaches all military issues as if they were but subsets of
strategic nuclear deterrence. The irony of
this approach—Cold War thinking at its
grimmest—appears completely to have
eluded the author, who spent much of
his scholarly career worrying about issues
of deterrence theory and nuclear command and control. At the same time,
Steinbruner does not see the end of the
Cold War as a victory for deterrence or
democratic ideology. Referring to it
rather as an unexpected “spontaneous
event” that took everyone involved by
surprise, he sees it as the result of “the
working of very large forces”—presumably the forces of globalization, although
he is never very clear on that.
Steinbruner’s treatment of globalization
itself—which he describes only in terms
of advances in technology and population dynamics—is disappointing. Others
have written much better treatments. The
book does not contain a serious examination of the direct impact of globalization on national security or military
forces, only a continuing assertion that
globalization has effects and that, whatever they are, they justify adoption of the
author’s “reassurance” policies. These
policies are similar to, but more radical
and seemingly less practical than, those
put forward as “cooperative security” by
former secretary of defense William
Perry. He certainly would not agree with
Steinbruner that all national militaries
must be equalized in capabilities and
force structure. Steinbruner cites the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the founding of Nato as examples of
reassurance and equal treatment of nations
in regard to security, but he forgets to
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mention violations of the NPT or to explain why nations would have joined Nato
had there been no inequitable Soviet threat.
Even those who share the author’s beliefs
in a smaller American defense structure
or minimal deterrence would be confused by many of his supporting reasons.
At one point, Steinbruner castigates the
former colonial powers for not intervening quickly enough in the civil wars of
their violence-prone former colonies.
How would they do so without possessing superior military force? Steinbruner
describes the internal conflict that
plagues much of the world, including terrorism, as a “contagion”—as if it were a
theoretical illness that had nothing to do
with actions of actual people. As in the
logic (some might say illogic) of the prisoners’ dilemma and tit-for-tat games
once used to describe the theory of nuclear deterrence, neither the magnanimity nor the fears of the human spirit play
a role in this book’s equation.
Despite the publisher’s reputation and
the implied support of influential
(mostly retired) authorities, serious students of globalization or defense policy
should avoid this book. It is not merely a
weak argument; these are not principles
of global security for the real world.
SAM TANGREDI

Captain, U.S. Navy
National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Williams, Cindy, ed. Holding the Line: U.S. Defense
Alternatives for the 21st Century. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2001. 289pp. $21.95

This is the rare book that actually lives up
to its blurbs. It should be required reading for U.S. defense planners, especially
Bush administration officials for whom
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increasing defense spending rather than
“holding the line” is an article of faith.
They would profit greatly from the volume’s analysis of where not to look for
the savings that might pay for the administration’s promised transformation of
the military. Hint: cutting infrastructure
will not pay for military transformation.
Cindy Williams, a senior research fellow
in the Strategic Studies Program at MIT
and a former assistant director for national security at the Congressional Budget Office, has assembled an impressive
group of contributors. In a focused, well
integrated volume, they take on a range
of pressing defense issues that converge
on a central, critical question: how can
the U.S. military be reshaped—transformed—while holding the line on defense spending? Holding the line means
maintaining defense spending at about
$300 billion (in fiscal year 2000 budgetauthority dollars) for ten years. That
amount, it is argued, is sufficient for
transformation if it is spent effectively
and efficiently—which requires merely
discarding outmoded strategy and force
structure.
In her introductory chapter, Williams
lays the foundation for what follows with
an instructive discussion of the post–Cold
War drawdown, the pressures generating
rising defense costs, the reasons we
should not succumb to those pressures,
and the need to reconcile strategy and
practice and to recalibrate the twomajor-theater-wars yardstick that was
used to size U.S. conventional forces after
the Gulf War. An effective force-protection
device, the two-major-theater-wars standard is both the source of rising defense
costs and an obstacle to a fiscally responsible transformation of the U.S. military.
Williams is especially struck by the fact
that each service’s share of defense
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